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ABSTRACT
Android’s permission system empowers informed privacy de-
cisions when installing third-party applications. However, ex-
amining the access permissions is not enough to assess privacy
exposure; even seemingly harmless applications can severely
expose user data. This is what we demonstrate here: an ap-
plication with the common READ EXTERNAL STORAGE
and the INTERNET permissions can be the basis of extract-
ing and inferring a wealth of private information. What has
been overlooked is that such a “curious” application can prey
on data stored in the Android’s commonly accessible external
storage or on unprotected phone sensors. By accessing and
stealthily extracting data thought to be unworthy of protec-
tion, we manage to access highly sensitive information: user
identifiers and habits. Leveraging data-mining techniques,
we explore a set of popular applications, establishing that
there is a clear privacy danger for numerous users installing
innocent-looking and but, possibly, “curious” applications.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Android permission system was a significant step to-
wards addressing the privacy concerns about the sensitive
user information collected from third-party applications. It
requires users of non-rooted devices to scrutinize permis-
sion requests made by applications. This way, they make
informed decisions in an all-or-nothing approach [1]; they
either accept all permissions or they opt out and do not use
the application [2]. Such decisions, in turn, have an impact on
their privacy since granting the requested permissions reveals
different pieces of their personal information. Nonetheless,
the meaningfulness of the provided feedback is controversial;
studies [3] have demonstrated that the majority of Android
users do not pay attention to, or understand, such permission
prompts especially when they prevent immediate gratification
(e.g., when users have decided to install an application) [4].
Furthermore, although Android permissions allow a (coarse-
grained) regulation of an application’s access to private in-
formation, they fail to provide comprehensive insights on
how this information is actually used [5]. Even worse, in
many cases, the access rights requested by applications are
inordinate to the functionality they offer [6]. To mitigate the
consequences of permission over-provisioning, state-of-the-
art privacy research proposes mechanisms that utilize static
analysis [7], or retrofit the Android runtime environment [5]
with privacy controls over the data applications access. Other
works suggest substituting private and sensitive information
with innocuous shadow data [8], or deterring the transmission
of sensitive information over the network [9].
At the same time, there has been awareness in the commu-
nity that external storage can have useful/sensitive informa-
tion [10], it is still not considered a significant concern [11].
This work shows that it is a mistake to consider data in ex-
ternal memory unworthy of protection. All it takes is to lure
unsuspecting users to install seemingly innocent but “curious”
applications that simply accesses the external storage.
On top of that, these data may be augmented with smart-
phone sensor data; mobile devices are increasingly equipped
with a range of sensors such as GPS, microphone, accelerom-
eter, light, and proximity sensors. These sensors can be ef-
fectively used to infer a user’s context including his location,
transportation mode, social state, etc [12]. Although some of
these hardware components (e.g., microphone, camera) are
mediated and protected by the operating system (through
permission requests), others require no permission and are
accessible by any third-party application via intents and
deputy apps [13]. In this work, we show that even with a
simple analysis of any values retrieved from such“unprotected”
sensors, one can get valuable insights about a user activities.
Contributions: We consider applications for which An-
droid’s play market states that “this application does not
require any special permissions” and we show how they can
act as gateways into users’ personal data. From a corpus
of the most downloaded (free) Android applications (e.g.,
social networking, messaging, infotainment, navigation, etc.),
we demonstrate how someone can: (i) extract private user
information (user identifiers, activities, habits and location)
and (ii) create an accurate profile of applications and activi-
ties, executed on the host device, simply by examining what
these popular applications store on the commonly accessible
external storage and by leveraging the phone’s unprotected
sensors. We employ data-mining techniques ranging from face
recognition to natural language processing, (iii) to attain
other highly sensitive information (list of contacts and phone
numbers), without requesting the appropriate “dangerous”
permissions (as these could arouse suspicion). The contribu-
tion of this work is to highlight that user privacy does not
only depend on the understanding of the granted permissions
but also on the cautious usage of the commonly accessible and
unprotected sources of information. Indeed, forensics analysts,
with physical access to the device, have (authorized) access to
any type of stored information. Nonetheless, in this work we
show that even the simplest of zero-permission applications
can do the same. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to concretize and investigate the threat the community
suspected and yet has not deemed a pressing matter.
Focus: Table 1 enumerates all the Android applications,
considered in this work, along with the number of user down-
loads and their respective market scores; these values are
indicative of their popularity and trust as perceived by the
Application Downloads Market Score
Facebook 1000 - 5000 (M) 4.0
WhatsApp 500 - 1000 (M) 4.4
Skype 500 - 1000 (M) 4.1
Twitter 100 - 500 (M) 4.1
Instagram 100 - 500 (M) 4.5
Viber 100 - 500 (M) 4.3
Snapchat 100 - 500 (M) 4.0
WeChat 100 - 500 (M) 4.3
Tango 100 - 500 (M) 4.2
LinkedIn 10 - 50 (M) 4.2
Vine 10 - 50 (M) 4.2
Foursquare 10 - 50 (M) 4.0
Swarm 5 - 10 (M) 3.8
Spotify 50 - 100 (M) 4.5
YouTube 1000 - 5000 (M) 4.1
Flipboard 100 - 500 (M) 4.4
PushBullet 1 - 10 (M) 4.4
Dropbox 100 - 500 (M) 4.5
AirDroid 10 - 50 (M) 4.5
NavFree 10 - 50 (M) 4.1
Be-On-Road 10 - 50 (M) 4.1
GPSTest 5 - 10 (M) 4.4
OneDrive 10 - 50 (M) 4.4
Table 1: Free Android applications considered in this work
users [14]. Our focus is on the kind of data that may be
the target of severe privacy violation, notably: (i) Communi-
cation data, such as SMS, MMS, Voice messages, etc., (ii)
Media data, from the camera or microphone (iii) Location
data, i.e., GPS data (exact location) or location inferred
from the users’ social network and geotagged photos, (iv)
Text data, including documents and emails among others, (v)
Contacts, i.e., the users’ list of contacts extracted either by
the smart-phone’s address book or by the social media that
the user participates in, (vi) History/Usage data indicating
the user’s preferences, (vii) Identity data; i.e., all the unique
identifiers that can be leveraged to identify a user, e.g., device
ID, email address, profile ID, etc., and (viii) Contextual data
that can be used to infer a user’s context and activity (i.e., by
leveraging unprotected phone sensors such as accelerometer,
gyroscope, magnetometer and temperature sensors).
Nonetheless, we do not solely focus on the types of sensitive
information that can be directly extracted from a smart-
phone but also on the analysis mechanisms that can be
applied in order to ex-filtrate as much information as possible.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 and
3 present the analysis framework and the inference process
we perform over the data acquired from the smart-phone.
Sec. 4 presents our findings alongside with an evaluation of
the employed inference mechanisms. Sec. 5 discusses possible
mitigation mechanisms. Finally, Sec. 6 concludes this work.
2. FRAMEWORK DESIGN
Our data extraction and analysis framework comprises two
parts: an Android client running on the user’s smart-phone
and an analysis server that performs the off-line analysis and
inferences over the ex-filtrated user data.
Android Client: Our client requests the two most com-
mon, and seemingly harmless, permissions [15]: the INTER-
NET and READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permissions which
are given by default to applications running on newer An-
droid versions [16]. Simply put, when installing such a mobile
application, users will be prompted with a (comforting) mes-
sage stating that “this application does not require any special
permissions”. The client traverses all files, residing on the
external storage, and sends them to the server for further
analysis; it does not perform any local data analysis on the de-
vice. It also accesses the unprotected phone sensors and sends
the retrieved values to the server for processing (Sec. 3.3).
To enhance the stealthiness of this client-server communi-
cation, one could program the application to transmit data
only when the phone is connected to some Wi-Fi network
(i.e., by requesting the ACCESS WIFI STATE permission).
The rationale is to prevent extensive usage of the cellular
bandwidth because this could serve as an indication of dispro-
portional, for the purpose of the application, network usage.
Note, however, that this permission is not necessary for our
design because it is considered intrusive. Moreover, the client
can encrypt the data it transmits to the server in order to
avoid possible traffic analysis from any existing information-
flow tracking system [5]. It can also operate during periods
that the phone is “inactive”. To do this, we leverage the
accelerometer sensor to examine whether the device remains
motionless for long periods of time (e.g., when the phone is
placed horizontally during early morning hours).
The aforementioned functionality is covert ; if such an ap-
plication would be deployed on the market it would also have
to offer a service to users so that they use it. Nevertheless,
the overt functionality is beyond the scope of this work.
Analysis Server: After receiving the various data files
(e.g., text, image, audio), the analysis server performs the
off-line analysis for extracting sensitive information.
3. FILE ANALYSIS
3.1 Image Files
Images constitute one of the most common type of files
stored on Android’s external storage. They range from appli-
cation icons and photos exchanged by users (through social
networking and instant messaging applications) to photos
taken by the smart-phone’s cameras (i.e., located in the
DCIM folder). Depending on the application that generated
an image (this can be easily inferred by the path of the file),
we analyze the files for the following types of information.
3.1.1 Face Detection
Images retrieved from the DCIM folder are (most probably)
photos taken by the user. Therefore, we initially run a face
recognition algorithm to detect (possible) faces. To do this, we
employ the implementations of well-known algorithms from
the OpenCV1 platform. We used pre-trained Local Binary
Pattern (LBP) classifiers included with the OpenCV library
for face detection. In case we confirm the existence of faces,
we extract the EXIF (Exchangeable Image file Format) meta-
data from the image file. These contain copious information
of interest: timestamps of when the photo was captured and
camera identifiers that reveal which phone camera was used.
Leveraging these meta-data, we first focus on the photos
taken with the front-facing camera of the device (i.e., the
value 0 of the FNumber attribute reveals this). Since the
most common use of this type of camera is for self-portrait
pictures, our goal is to identify any photos that capture the
user’s face. On the other hand, for photos taken using the
back facing camera, we examine the phone rotation at the
time the photo was captured. More specifically, we look at the
Image Direction field of the EXIF meta-data, which contains
the camera’s rotation when the photo was taken. This is
calculated using the smart-phone’s embedded sensors (i.e.,
accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer) and it can give
1http://opencv.org
us a good insight on the content of the photo: if the rotation
value is within the [160, 190] degrees interval then we can
(with high probability) assume that the photo contains the
user’s face (e.g., photos commonly known as “selfies”). In
both cases, these photos are of particular interest because
they may contain user identifying information.
Besides simple face detection, the analysis of such face-
containing images also enables the extraction of, ample, user
profiling information. By leveraging face characterization
algorithms, we can further infer the user’s age (i.e., a coarse-
grained age), genre, race, face attributes (e.g., beard and
mustache ) and emotional status (when the photo was taken).
To do this, we employ Face++ API2 which provides facial
analysis algorithms (see Sec. 4).
3.1.2 Location Extraction
Android provides an option for geotagging photos, i.e.,
saving the geographical coordinates of the device when the
photo was taken. These coordinates are stored inside the
GPS “Latitude” and “Longitude” fields of the EXIF meta-
data. If no such location information is available, we try
to make a best-effort approximation by applying a reverse
Google Image search. The result of such a search contains
various pieces of information describing the queried image,
including a “best guess” field; a text description of the image
in question. In most cases, the best guess is the name of the
monument/area/landmark captured by the picture (Sec.4.2).
3.1.3 Social Interests Inference
To ex-filtrate a user’s social interests, we leverage images
created by social networking applications and newsreaders.
As an example, consider Twitter whose mobile client caches
(inside a dedicated directory in the external storage) the
avatars of all people a user “follows”. The usual purpose
of these avatars is to convey short information about their
owners. Therefore, we can leverage such images in order to
infer some of the user interests and likings.
First, we obtain a text description of the image from the
best guess result of Google’s reverse image search. Based on
the outcome, we then retrieve keywords associated with the
given text by querying “DBpedia.org”.3 To exemplify this,
assume a user follows the official account of the CNN news
agency. The avatar used by the CNN account (stored on
the SD card) is the CNN logo. Employing the reverse image
search gives us the term “cnn app” which, in turn, when
queried in DBpedia yields a number of associated terms such
as: television channel, basic cable and news channel.
Similar to Twitter, there are a number of other social
networking applications that can be used to ex-filtrate in-
formation about a user’s online social networks. Amongst
the most popular ones is LinkedIn, a business-oriented social
networking service. LinkedIn users create business profiles
and establish “connections”. LinkedIn’s application stores
(on the SD card) the profile pictures (or logos) of the people
and companies a user follows. By running the previously
described face detection algorithm (Sec. 3.1.1), we can iden-
tify and sift profile photos from other non-interesting images
(e.g., corporate logos). For the former, we then run a reverse
image search and retrieve the first 10 (for example) returned
results which (in most of the cases) point to the name of
the user. The same holds for location-based services such
2http://www.faceplusplus.com/
3DBpedia (http://dbpedia.org) is a community effort to
extract structured information from Wikipedia.
as Foursquare and, thus, the same approach can be applied.
Combining all such social-related information enables us to
construct parts of the user’s social network.
We use LinkedIn profile images because, given the purpose
of this service, it is likely that users upload high quality
professional profile photos. This facilitates the face detection
and recognition processes to produce better results.
3.2 Audio and Voice Messages
Most messaging applications supporting audio communi-
cations (i.e., voice messages) store unencrypted copies of all
audio messages a user sends or receives. This is surprising
considering the amount of privacy violating information that
may be extracted from such data. Nonetheless, leveraging
audio data to extract useful information is far from trivial.
Towards that, our framework provides the following steps:
Speech-To-Text (STT) translation: First, we convert
the audio file from the Advanced Audio Coding (AAC) for-
mat, which is used by most messaging applications, to the
Waveform Audio File (WAV) format. This is done through
the libav4 open source library, which provides cross-platform
tools to convert, manipulate and stream a wide range of
multimedia protocols. Such a transformation allows the sub-
sequent translation of the audio file to text by leveraging
AT&T’s STT library 5.
Part-of-Speech (PoS) tagging: The generated text tran-
script is given to a PoS tagger. This performs a syntactic
analysis, identifying the lexical categories (e.g., nouns, verbs,
adjectives) of the text produced during the STT phase.
These two pre-processing steps set the baseline for a deeper
inspection of the provided audio files. We focus on: (i) loca-
tion, (ii) time and (iii) user-referring information.
3.2.1 Location, Time & Named Entities
To extract possible location information from audio data,
we examine the produced text transcript for prepositions of
space; i.e., “in”, “on”, “to” and “at”. Once identified, we then
look for any singular or plural nouns (tagged as “NN” after
the PoS tagging phase) contained in the text. As an example,
consider the text phrase “Let’s meet at Sunset Boulevard”
retrieved from a WhatsApp voice message. The existence of
the “at” preposition is indicative of location.
To improve the performance of our analysis, we leverage
the various types of verbs that may be used in a phrase.
Active verbs denoting motion serve as evidence of location-
specific information (for instance “Driving to Manhattan”).
Moreover, passive verbs describing the user’s activity context
(i.e., waiting, to be, meet) can be effectively used to infer her
location. To automate the location extraction process, we
employ Stanford’s Named Entity Recognizer6 (NER), a li-
brary that provides text processing capabilities for extracting
various sentence features (e.g., in our case location). Location
can refer to cities, states, countries, etc.
The analysis of the PoS tagged transcript also provides
time-related information of user activities. We search for
time prepositions: “at”, “in” and “on”. Their identification is
now based on the contained time indexes (or intervals) of
described events; e.g., “Let’s meet at 1 pm”. Once more, we
employ Stanford’s NER to extract time-specific information.
4http://libav.org/
5http://developer.att.com/sdks-plugins/
speech-for-android
6http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF-NER.shtml
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Figure 1: Time-stamp Analysis.
We also examine audio files for named entities [17]. Stan-
ford’s NER comes with “named entity” recognizers for the
English language. In our work, the word “named” restricts
the task to only those entities for which one or many des-
ignators have been defined. For instance, “I am with Mary!
Will you join?” is referred to as “Mary” whereas “I work at
Google!” is referred to as “Google”. Rigid designators include
proper person names (i.e., Nick, Mary, etc.) as well as certain
popular organizations (i.e., Google, Skype, etc.).
3.3 Inferring User Context
As described in Sec. 2, our framework comprises an in-
ference engine that enables adversaries to target the user’s
contextual privacy; issue queries for extracting the user’s
context (e.g., sleeping, walking, training, etc.). Towards that,
the mobile client can access the phone sensors and send any
retrieved values to the analysis server. Recall that only the
phone camera and microphone require specific access permis-
sions. The rest of the sensors are “unprotected” meaning that
accessing them is not noticeable by the user. This can be done
either directly or indirectly via intents and deputy apps [13];
Android intents allow applications to access resources indi-
rectly by using deputy apps that have access to the requested
resource or information [18]. This is possible because intents
can be used for both inter- and intra-application invocations.
To infer user context we leverage random forests [19]: collec-
tions of decision trees, each trained over a different bootstrap
sample. We obtained the training set (i.e., sensor values
labeled with activities) from the PAMAP7 dataset which
contains sensor readings (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope, mag-
netometer) from 17 subjects performing 14 different activities
(e.g., walking, cycling, laying, ironing, computer work). We
considered only a subset of the including sensor types focusing
on those that are already available in current smart-phones:
temperature (Samsung Galaxy S4 has a dedicated tempera-
ture sensor), accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetometer.
Each decision tree of the random forest is a classification
model created during the exploration of the training set. The
interior nodes of the tree correspond to possible values of
the input data. For instance, an interior node could describe
the values a sensor s1 gets (e.g, s1 > α). Nodes can have
other nodes as children, thus, creating decision paths (e.g.,
s1 > α and s2 < β). Tree leaves mark decisions (i.e., the
classifications) of all training data described by the path
from the root to the leaf. For example, samples for which
sensors s1 and s2 take the values s1 > α and s2 < β refer to
the walking activity. After the training phase is completed,
7http://www.pamap.org/demo.html
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Figure 2: Profiling Application Activity.
the classifier infers the user’s context based on the sensor
values sent by the mobile client. More specifically, the client
monitors the phone’s sensors for a predefined period of time
and submits them to the analysis server. Upon reception,
these values are examined by the classifying ensemble and a
decision on the possible user context is produced.
3.4 Profiling Application Usage
Before Android Lollipop, applications granted with the
GET TASKS permission could query the ActivityManager
and retrieve all running tasks via the getRunningTasks()
method. For Android Lollipop, Google decided to deprecate
this functionality for privacy reasons as this method could
leak personal information to the caller [20]. Furthermore,
according to the Android team [21], this method has been a
significant attack vector for malicious apps allowing them to
examine the types of applications users employ or to launch
malicious actions when users perform specific actions.
Despite this newly introduced restriction, a simple examina-
tion of the last-modified time-stamp of specific files and folders
renders feasible the profiling of currently running applications.
More specifically, as it has been discussed so far, different
applications access different files residing on the phone’s ex-
ternal storage. Any malicious application monitoring specific
files can detect if, when and for how long an application is
used. For example8, by monitoring the last-modified time-
stamp of the file com.twitter.android/cache/users/journal, a
malicious application can detect if Twitter is running. Sim-
ilarly, the file com.instagram.android/cache/video/journal
gives information on whether the user has launched Insta-
gram. Our mobile client frequently retrieves (e.g., every 3
sec) the last-modified time-stamp of the application-specific
file. For example, let tsi and tsi−1 be the time-stamps of
an application specific file retrieved at times i and i− 1. If
dt = tsi − tsi−1 > 0 then this serves as an indication the
the application is active and is accessing the application spe-
cific file. Fig. 1 plots dt as a function of time. As the figure
shows, it is easy to detect when the application is launched
since when this happens the two consequent last-modified
time-stamps differ. Moreover, examining the time-interval
for which dt > 0 is an indication of the usage duration.
We leverage time-stamps to accurately profile a user through-
out long periods of time. Fig. 2 illustrates the usage patterns
of three applications retrieved from the phone of one of the au-
thors for a period of 24 hours. We plot time on the x−axis and
a boolean value on y−axis indicating whether the application
has has been activated at a given hour (done by retrieving
8Due to space limitations we provide some examples of ap-
plication specific files monitored by our system.
the last-accessed time-stamp). Of course, the mobile client
can monitor application specific files at any granularity (e.g.,
every 15 mins). For Spotify the client monitors the file /stor-
age/sdcard0/Android/data/com.spotify.music/files/spotifycac
he/mercury.db and for Google Maps the file /storage/sdcard
0/Android/data/com.google.android.apps.maps/cache/cache
its.m which is updated whenever the application is invoked.
4. ANDROID APPLICATION ANALYSIS
This section presents our findings from the extraction of
user private information from the phone’s external memory.
Towards that, we examine closely the data that are generated
by the chosen Android applications (Table 1) available in
the market. We then proceed with the assessment of our
framework’s accuracy and inference mechanisms.
Instant Messaging Applications: We begin our anal-
ysis by looking Viber. Viber keeps a configuration file with
information on the user identity, profile picture and phone
number. In particular, inside the Viber directory, the hidden
file .userdata contains the username specified when register-
ing with the messaging service. This identifier is often the
user’s real name. Furthermore, the canonicalized number field
(in the same file) carries the user’s phone number along with
the international call prefix for the specific country (based
on the mobile operator the device is registered with).
Most messaging applications encrypt text-based communi-
cations before storing them on the external storage. The only
exception is the Tango IM, which stores clear-text messages
and conversations in the com.sgiggle.production folder. Ex-
changed media (e.g images and audio files) are, in many cases,
stored unprotected. Viber caches voice messages under the
folder .ptt located in the application’s main directory (i.e.,
SDCard/Viber). Similarly, WeChat9 leaves all audio, video
and image files unprotected. In addition, WeChat enables
users to share their location by sending a map in the form
of an image. These images are also stored on the SD card,
thus, enabling the extraction of the user’s location.
Besides storing photos, audio messages and videos unpro-
tected, Skype provides (by far) the most privacy sensitive
information to any curious entity. Whenever users employ the
“automatically add friends” functionality, Skype’s Android
client generates an SQLite database which is essentially an
exact copy of the user’s address book. For instance, for a
user with skype id “Bob” the list of contacts is stored inside
the file “com.skype.raider/bob ingestion.db”. As one could
understand, this has severe privacy repercussions: an appli-
cation with (simple) read access privileges to the external
storage can essentially retrieve all the phone numbers and
email addresses in the user’s contact list.
Music Streaming Applications: Spotify keeps all con-
figuration files inside the com.spotify.music folder. The in-
ternal <user-id>-user sub-folder holds the user’s Spotify ID
(in its path name). We can leverage this identifier to retrieve
information about the user, by issuing a GET request to
https://api.spotify.com/v1/users/<user-id>. This returns a
JSON object with ample user-specific information, such as
the user display name, the number of followers she has and
her profile picture. Moreover, Spotify allows users to connect
(and authenticate) using their Facebook accounts. In this case,
the returned display name is the user’s Facebook ID which,
in most cases, is her name and surname (while the user’s
profile picture is her Facebook avatar). Examining whether
9Popular IM application in Asian countries.
Figure 3: Traces extracted from Google location history.
a user has federated her Spotify and Facebook accounts can
be done by checking the facebook connected field contained
in the orbit.settings file. This file can also be used to extract
information regarding the user’s LastFM account, another
music streaming service that can be connected to Spotify.
The local-files.bnk file contains the names of all the songs
a user has downloaded along with the respective paths of the
audio files. Moreover, inside the cosmos player state file, we
can find the user’s latest song search. The file oﬄine lists.bnk
contains all the playlists saved by a user. If a playlist was
created by a user’s friend, we also get her identifier.
Social Networking Applications: In Sec. 3.1.3 we dis-
cussed how the images stored by Twitter’s Android client
can be leveraged to infer information about the user. Ad-
ditional information can be extracted by examining the
data Twitter stores on the phone’s external storage. More
specifically, Twitter generates a binary file under the name
“abd <user id>” (where <user id> is the user’s account id)
inside the com.twitter.android folder. Knowing the user’s ac-
count id allows us to issue the following request to Twitter’s
API: https://api.twitter.com/1.1/users/show.json?user id
=<user id>. Assuming that the user does not have a pro-
tected account, this request will return the number of followers
a user has, her friends, the number of status updates, her
preferred language and her retweets with exact time-stamps
and links (i.e., mentions) to other user profiles.
Vine stores inside the co.vine.android folder files (the exact
file names differ for each user) containing the user’s username,
her id, her phone number, her email address and information
about connected accounts (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Another
file, in the same folder, stores the information (email address
and user ids) of the users she follows. Instagram stores all the
video files a user browses on the phone’s external memory.
Navigation Applications: The NavFree crowd-sourced
navigation application stores application-specific data inside
the com.navfree.android.OSM.ALL folder. The internal sub-
folder files/UserData has the Favorites.txt file that stores
all the points-of-interest (POIs) a user has saved, along with
their geographical coordinates. In the same folder, one can
also find the Home.txt file, which contains the geographical
coordinates of the user specified home location.
Be-On-Road, another navigation service, stores inside the
“Favorites” folder (residing on the cz.aponia.bor3 path) the
geographical coordinates of all the POIs, including home and
work locations and all the addresses a user has searched for.
Finally, the GPS Test navigation application, which pro-
vides a utility for showing the signal strength of in-range
satellites, saves a log file on the external storage that contains
all user’s visited locations along with time-stamps.
Cloud Storage Applications: Microsoft OneDrive caches
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Figure 4: Gender (a), age (b) and race (c) detection from user photos.
on the external memory the files a user downloads (inside the
com.microsoft.skydrive directory). The internal sub-folder
instrumentationApplicationInsightsV1Channel keeps detailed
log user uploads. These files contain additional information
such as time-stamps, device model and the Android version.
Similarly, Dropbox saves on the external memory all files a
user uploads or downloads. Moreover, detecting the Dropbox
account id can be done by examining the name of the folder
inside the path com.dropbox.android.
AirDroid is a popular application allowing users to manage
their Android phones and tablets via their PCs. Inside the
directory “com.sand.raider/com.sand.airdroid/files” the file
main.log contains the following pieces of information: (i) the
phone’s IMSI, (ii) the phone’s IP address, (iii) the network
connection type (i.e., wireless or cellular), and (iv) the user’s
email address and her name. In case the user employs Google
as the authentication provider, then the extracted name field
is the user’s actual name (i.e., first and surname). Moreover,
AirDroid also allows users to locate their phones. Enabling
this functionality, allows the extraction of their fine-grained
geographic location along with the time-stamp of when the
query was issued (stored in the same main.log file)
PushBullet is a file sharing and messaging application. In-
side the folder com.pushbullet.android the application stores
a log file. This log file contains the email address with which
the user registers to the service. Moreover, the same file holds
information about the email addresses of a user’s contacts.
Invoking Browsers: Although popular browsers do not
store any sensitive information on the phone’s external stor-
age, we can still exploit them to extract particular user fea-
tures. More specifically, we focus on users that have logged-in
(with their browsers) to their Google profiles. Launching an
intent for https://maps.google.com/locationhistory/b/0/kml?
startTime=<s>&endTime=<e> (where <s> and <e> de-
fine the starting and ending date in “epochs”) retrieves the
user’s location history (for that period) and stores it on the
external storage. Of course, this requires that the user has
enabled the location service on her mobile phone. The re-
trieved XML file (accessible by any application) contains the
latitude and longitude coordinates along with detailed time
information (Fig. 3). With this data, we can (for example)
infer the user’s home and work location.
4.1 Face Recognition and Characterization
We begin with an assessment of the face detection analysis
presented in Sec. 3.1.1. Our goal is to detect user facial
attributes by examining retrieved self-portrait photos (i.e.,
“selfies”captured from their smart-phones). We focus on three
attributes: (i) user gender, (ii) age and (iii) race: they are
important for face recognition-based marketing [22].
For our evaluation, we used photos from the SelfieCity10
dataset, containing 3200 Instagram selfie photos of users
with various lighting conditions, expressions and realistic
backgrounds. Each photo is categorized according to different
criteria (e.g., user age and gender). Furthermore, many of
these photos contain filters (e.g., black-white), as usually
is the case with the pictures users share on Instagram. We
believe this dataset is similar to the photos one would expect
to find stored on the external storage of average users’ devices.
We present our findings, on correctly identifying a user’s
attributes, through confusion matrices. Each column of the
matrix shows the“predicted” instances of a class (e.g., male or
female), while each row shows the true class of the instances.
The diagonal elements (in the matrices) show the number of
correct classifications made for each class (i.e., true positives
and negatives), and the off-diagonal elements indicate the
errors (i.e., false positives and negatives).
Fig. 4 (a) depicts the gender classification results of 40
user photos (i.e., 20 male and 20 female users). As we can
see, it is relatively easy to detect the user gender from user
photos. In particular, the gender detection algorithm correctly
identified all photos of female users and misclassified only
one male. Next we move on to the age detection process
(again by considering 40 user photos). In this case, we split
users into two groups; one group comprises 20 photos of
users within the [17, 25] years old interval whereas the second
group contains photos of users that are older than 25 years
old. These age groups are considered to be important for the
planning and execution of marketing campaigns [23]. As we
can see in Fig. 4 (b), the Face++ algorithm is almost 100%
successful in correctly identifying the user’s age based on her
photos. Indeed, 19 users below the age of 25 years old were
correctly classified whereas only one user was falsely identified
as older. Furthermore, 17 users in the above 25 years old
class were classified correctly (i.e., 3 incorrect classifications).
Finally, Fig. 4 (c) presents the race classification results
for 60 individuals belonging to three different ethic groups
(Caucasian, Negroid and Mongoloid). Once more, we observe
that it is relatively easy to accurately identify a user’s race.
Note, however, that the presented results do not intend to
10http://selfiecity.net
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Figure 5: Location Extraction from user photos (a) and voice messages (b). Name extraction from audio messages (c).
evaluate the accuracy of the employed face detection software.
Our goal is to highlight the ease of identifying user attributes
(by analyzing photos stored on the external storage) with
even readily available tools. All it takes is for the user to
download a seemingly benign, but curious, application.
4.2 Analysis of Photos and Voice Messages
First, we assess the extraction of location information from
user photos (Sec. 3.1.2). For this experiment, we make use of
120 photos taken by 6 users (i.e., 20 photos from each user)
and we examine for how many of them we are able to extract
fine-grained location-specific data. We sample photos taken
with different types of mobile devices in order to demonstrate
that our findings do not depend on the multiplicity or the
kind of utilized hardware and software. These photos are
capturing landmarks of different cities and countries.
As we can see in Fig. 5 (a), we are (on average) able to infer
location information from 51 photos (i.e., 42.5% accuracy)
by leveraging reverse Google image search. Note that users
were requested to provide us with photos of their choice.
As a result, some of them (e.g., user 1 and user 3) gave us
pictures of famous landmarks of major U.S. or European cities
whereas the rest provided photos of less famous landscapes.
Moreover, we do not consider here the extraction of location
information from the image meta-data as it is trivial.
Next, we evaluate the analysis of voice messages as pre-
sented in Sec 3.2.1. We refrain from assessing the accuracy
of the STT translation because this is reflected in the perfor-
mance of the employed natural language processing to detect
location and named entities; better STT translation yields
higher location and name extraction accuracy. First, we focus
on extracting location information from the audio files. In
particular, we asked six subjects (3 male and 3 female) to
arrange a hypothetical meeting by sending 20 voice messages
on WhatsApp. The meeting place was selected from a list
of famous places in the U.S (e.g., Soho, Michigan Avenue,
Central Park). The participating subjects come from dif-
ferent countries and, thus, have different English skills and
accents. Fig. 5 (b) depicts our results: on average we extract
correct location information from 60% of the voice messages.
Although the output heavily depends on the English skills of
each subject (e.g., subject 3 is a native English speaker), we
manage to overall achieve high accuracy (> 50%).
Finally, Fig. 5 (c) presents our findings on the extraction
of named entities (from voice messages). As we can see, the
achieved accuracy is significantly higher compared to the
case of location extraction: names are, usually, single-word
or short words and, thus, they can be detected easier.
4.3 User Context Detection
We evaluate the accuracy of the classifier ensemble focus-
ing on the accuracy of user-context classification. For each
evaluation, we select one subject of the PAMAP dataset, at
random, as the classifier’s training input. We then evaluate
the ensemble’s accuracy for the remaining subjects.
As depicted in Fig. 6 (a), the overall classification accuracy
is above 50%. This serves as the best indication that we can,
indeed, use various sensor readings to target user contextual
privacy. Fig. 6 (b) illustrates the ensemble classification
accuracy as a function of the sampling rate of the mobile
client: as the sampling rate decreases, the classifier’s accuracy
drops. However, even for small sampling rates (1 sample every
45 sec), the classification accuracy still remains relatively
high (' 50%). Finally, Fig. 6 (c) presents the informativeness
of the employed sensor types with respect to user contexts.
We express “sensor importance” as the (normalized) total
reduction of uncertainty brought by that feature (i.e., the
Gini index [19]). As it can be seen, magnetometers and
gyroscopes are the most privacy intrusive sensors.
5. POSSIBLE MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Google restricted in Android 4.4 write access to the ex-
ternal storage. More specifically, applications do not have
write privileges to locations outside their owned area (i.e.,
/Android/data/application name). This, essentially, prevents
applications from manipulating data not belonging to them.
Unfortunately, applying the same access control with respect
to read access is far from trivial; it would affect, many appli-
cations (file managers, anti-viruses and backup software).
To reduce the privacy exposure of users is the proper
handling of sensitive user information. More specifically, user
photos can be protected by mechanisms such as the one
described in [24], enabling user control over their photos; if
users tag photos as sensitive, then they cannot be accessed
by any other third-party application.
Moreover, audio and video communication files should be
protected just as it is the case with text communications.
Simply put, there is no point in encrypting text messages and
leaving audio and video messages unprotected (e.g., as most
messaging applications do). Of course, encryption of audio
and video data should not significantly affect user experience.
Similarly, configuration files should not be safely stored on
the phone’s internal memory.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This work demonstrated how simple and seemingly harm-
less Android applications can be used as gateways into our
lay stand walk iron
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Figure 6: Inferring User Context: (a,b) Classification Accuracy, (c) Sensor Evaluation.
personal data. We did this by focusing on what has been,
so far, overlooked by the Android privacy community: the
breadth and the wealth of the privacy-harming information
stored on Android’s external storage and the informative-
ness of unprotected phone sensors. Leveraging data-mining
techniques and publicly available libraries we showed that
user privacy depends on the cautious usage of commonly ac-
cessible memory locations. We hope this work will stimulate
further research on this matter, especially because it is now
obvious that (the true) user privacy exposure is up to any
curious or malevolent actor or Android developer.
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